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PRIVACY PLEASE – DIRECT OBSERVATION
DRUG TESTING & INVASION OF PRIVACY
Elizabeth Black

I. INTRODUCTION
In August 2020, the Supreme Court of Ohio in Lunsford v. Sterilite of
Ohio, LLC held that an at-will employee who consents to submit a urine
sample for a drug screening has no cause of action for invasion of
privacy.1
Sterilite of Ohio, LLC (“Sterilite”), a private company that
manufactures plastic storage containers,2 had a workplace substance
abuse policy that applied to all employees. Compliance with the substance
abuse policy was a condition of employment.3 Beginning in October
2016, Sterilite imposed a drug testing procedure that required employees’
urine samples to be collected using the direct observation method,4 which
requires a same-sex monitor to accompany the employee into the
restroom to visually observe the employee produce a urine sample. 5 In
December 2016, current and former at-will employees brought suit
against their employer, Sterilite, and the third-party agent U.S.
Healthworks Medical Group of Ohio, Inc. (“U.S. Healthworks”),
asserting invasion of privacy and wrongful discharge in violation of
public policy claims.6
The majority, in a 4-3 split decision, found for Sterilite because (1) the
at-will employment relationship required compliance with Sterilite’s
workplace substance abuse policy;7 (2) no Fourth Amendment
protections, Ohio statutes, or constitutional provisions attach due to
Sterilite’s status as a private company;8 and (3) the employees willingly
consented to the direct observation method, waiving their right to
privacy.9 Under the Lunsford decision, a private employer, as standard
practice, may subject an at-will employee to highly offensive and
intrusive urine collection methods, leaving the employee without legal
recourse. The dissenting judges disagreed, arguing that (1) Sterilite’s
invasive drug testing procedure violated the employees’ right to
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

162 Ohio St. 3d 231 (Ohio 2020).
STERILITE CORP., https://www.sterilite.com (last visited Oct. 11, 2022).
Lunsford, 162 Ohio St. 3d at 233.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 232.
Id. at 238.
Id. at 239.
Id. at 240.
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privacy;10 (2) the at-will employment doctrine does not supplant an
employee’s right to bring a claim against the employer for invasion of
privacy;11 and (3) the employees did not consent, directly or implicitly, as
to the method of the drug test.12
This Comment analyzes the close (4-3) divide in the controversial
Lunsford v. Sterilite of Ohio, LLC decision. This Comment brings
attention to the effect the Lunsford decision may have on employees
working for private employers. Section II of this Comment situates
Lunsford within the context of Ohio’s employment-at-will doctrine and
the common law tort claim for invasion of privacy. Section III argues that
the Supreme Court of Ohio makes a false distinction between a public and
private employer in regard to whether a court should consider an
individual’s right to privacy. Further, Section III advocates for the Ohio
judiciary to adopt a balancing test recommended by the Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit in Borse v. Piece Goods Shop, Inc., which weighs
the employer’s business interests against the employee’s privacy interests
and offers guidance as to the proper form of notice and employee consent
for private employers who choose to use the direct observation method.13
Finally, this Comment concludes in Section IV by stating that the
Supreme Court of Ohio should have found for the employees, holding
that, in some instances, an at-will employee has a cause of action for
invasion of privacy if they are compelled to consent to urinalysis via
direct observation.
BACKGROUND
This Section begins in Section II(A) by outlining the development and
application of the employment-at-will doctrine in Ohio and recognizing
the doctrine’s essential exceptions. Section II(B) addresses an
individual’s right to privacy in the context of Ohio’s common-law tort
claim for invasion of privacy and, more specifically, intrusion upon
seclusion. Section II(C) provides a case study examining when unduly
invasive investigation measures violate an individual’s expectation of
privacy. Section II(D) acknowledges that employers have a general right
to drug test employees as a condition of employment, highlighting the
several urine collection methods available that maintain the integrity of
the specimen. Section II(D) further discusses the distinctions between
public and private sector employers in utilizing the direct observation
method in employment-related drug testing. Section II(E) concludes with
10.
11.
12.
13.

Id. at 244.
Id. at 247.
Id.
963 F.2d 611 (3d Cir. 1992).
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a discussion of the Supreme Court of Ohio’s ruling in Lunsford.
A. Employment At Will
Ohio recognizes the employment-at-will doctrine.14 The employmentat-will doctrine allows either party – employer or employee – to terminate
the employment relationship at any time and for “any reason which is not
contrary to law.”15 Traditionally, Ohio’s employment-at-will doctrine
permitted an employer to dismiss an employee-at-will “‘for any cause, at
any time whatsoever, even if done in gross or reckless disregard of [an]
employee’s rights.’”16
However, under Ohio’s modern employment-at-will doctrine, an
employer does not have such unbridled discretion. Both the legislature
and the judiciary have limited the employment-at-will doctrine’s broad
scope.17 Notably, Ohio has five exceptions to the employment-at-will
doctrine.18 The five exceptions are: (1) an employment contract provides
for a specific employment term or job protection;19 (2) certain facts and
circumstances imply an employment contract has been formed; 20 (3)
promissory estoppel; (4) the termination was against public policy;21 and
(5) the termination violated state and/or federal law.22
Importantly, the Supreme Court of Ohio in Greeley v. Miami Valley
Maintenance Contractors, Inc.23 recognized an exception to the
14. La France Elec. Const. & Supply Co. v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local
No. 8, 108 Ohio St. 61, (Ohio 1923).
15. Mers v. Dispatch Printing Co., 19 Ohio St. 3d 100, 103 (Ohio 1985). See also Lake Land Emp.
Grp. Akron, LLC v. Columber, 101 Ohio St. 3d 242, 247 (Ohio 2004) (“If, for instance an employer
notifies an employee that the employee’s compensation will be reduced, the employee’s remedy, if
dissatisfied, is to quit. Similarly, if the employee proposes to the employer that he deserves a raise and
will no longer work at his current rate, the employer may either negotiate an increase or accept the loss of
his employee.”).
16. Painter v. Graley, 70 Ohio St. 3d 377, 382 (Ohio 1994) (alteration in original) (quoting Phung
v. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 491 N.E.2d 1114, 1116 (Ohio 1986)).
17. Mers, 19 Ohio St. 3d at 103.
18. Neil E. Klingshirn, At-Will Employment Is the Rule in Ohio, OHIO STATE BAR ASS’N (May
12, 2016), https://www.ohiobar.org/public-resources/commonly-asked-law-questions-results/labor-employment/at-will-employment-is-the-rule-in-ohio.
19. Id. An example of job protection would be a “termination only for ‘just cause’” clause in the
employment contract.
20. Id. Examples of facts and circumstances that may imply an employment contract include
relevant sections in employee handbooks, an employer’s oral representation of job security in exchange
for good performance, etc.
21. Painter v. Graley, 70 Ohio St. 3d 377, (Ohio 1994). See also Greeley v. Miami Valley Maint.
Contractors, Inc., 49 Ohio St. 3d 228, 233 (Ohio 1990).
22. Klingshirn, supra note 20. Employment-at-will doctrine’s broad scope is limited by laws
prohibiting (1) retaliatory termination when an injured employee files a workers’ compensation claim or
participates in union activities and (2) discrimination on the basis of age, race, sex, or disability. Id.
23. Greeley v. Miami Valley Maint. Contractors, Inc., 49 Ohio St. 3d 228 (Ohio 1990).
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traditionally harsh employment-at-will doctrine by allowing a terminated
employee to assert a private tort action where the termination was against
sufficiently clear public policy.24 In Greeley, the Supreme Court of Ohio
considered whether an at-will employee can be terminated solely because
of a court-ordered assignment of the employee’s wages, which would
have been a violation of Ohio Revised Code Section 3113.25 The court
acknowledged that the employer violated the relevant statute;26 however,
violation of the statute would only have resulted in a minimal fine, leaving
the employee without a proper remedy against the employer.27 The court,
pointing to the unbalanced remedial actions, determined that when an
employer terminates an employee for a reason prohibited by statute, a
civil cause of action is available to the employee for the unlawful
termination.28
The Supreme Court of Ohio in Painter v. Graley expanded what may
constitute “clear public policy” by allowing courts to look beyond the four
corners of statutory law.29 The clear public policy necessary to justify an
exception to Ohio’s employment-at-will doctrine extends beyond public
policy explicitly expressed by legislative statute to include the common
law. The Court reasoned that “‘[w]hen the common law has been out of
step with the times, and the legislature . . . has not acted, we have
undertaken to change the law . . . .’”30 Painter v. Graley allowed the court
to have flexibility outside the bounds of the Ohio General Assembly to
determine, based on the facts and circumstances of each case, whether an
employer violated clear public policy.31
B. Invasion of Privacy / Intrusion Upon Seclusion
The right to privacy is the “right of a person to be let alone, to be free
of unwarranted publicity, and to live without unwarranted interference by
the public in matters with which the public is not necessarily
concerned.”32 Therefore, the tort of invasion of privacy guards a person’s
24. Id. at 233.
25. Id. at 229. “No employer may use an order to withhold personal earnings . . . as a basis for a
discharge of, or for any disciplinary action against, an employee, or as a basis for a refusal to employ a
person. The court may fine an employer who so discharges or takes disciplinary action against an
employee, or refuses to employ a person, not more than five hundred dollars.” Id. at 230 (emphasis
omitted).
26. Id. at 231.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 234.
29. Painter v. Graley, 70 Ohio St. 3d 377, 383–84 (Ohio 1994).
30. Id. at 384 (alteration in original) (quoting Gallimore v. Children’s Hosp. Med. Ctr., 67 Ohio
St. 3d 244, 253 (Ohio 1993)).
31. Id. (citing Gallimore v. Children’s Hosp. Med. Ctr., 67 Ohio St. 3d 244, 253 (Ohio 1993)).
32. Lunsford v. Sterilite of Ohio, LLC, 108 N.E.3d 1235, 1240 (Ohio Ct. App. 2018) (quoting
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right to “personal dignity and self-respect.”33 The common law tort claim
for invasion of privacy in Ohio dates back to the Supreme Court of Ohio’s
1956 decision in Housh v. Peth.34
A person who intentionally intrudes upon the privacy of another in such
a manner that would be “highly offensive to a reasonable person” 35 is
subject to liability under a tortious invasion of privacy claim. 36 In Housh,
a woman had outstanding debt and was consequently systematically
harassed by her debt collector.37 The debt collector telephoned the woman
incessantly at all hours of the day.38 The phone calls intruded upon the
woman’s daily affairs.39 For example, the debt collector called the
woman’s employer, a public school, to inform them of the debt.40 The
phone calls interrupted her teaching as she was called out of her classroom
three times within fifteen minutes.41 The debt collector also called the
woman at her residence, a rooming house.42 The continuous calls resulted
in her employer threatening termination as well as the loss of a tenant at
her rooming house.43 The woman subsequently filed suit against the debt
collector, claiming invasion of her right to privacy.44
The Supreme Court of Ohio in Housh determined that the debt collector
had a right to take reasonable action to recover the outstanding debt.45
However, the court recognized that the debt collector went too far and
used unreasonable tactics in his efforts to satisfy the debt.46 Based on the
facts of this case, the court was compelled to institute an actionable claim
for invasion of privacy. To warrant a claim for invasion of privacy, a
plaintiff must demonstrate the “unwarranted appropriation or exploitation
of one’s personality, the publicizing of one’s private affairs with which
the public has no legitimate concern, or the wrongful intrusion into one’s
private activities in such a manner as to outrage or cause mental suffering,
Housh v. Peth, 133 N.E.2d 340, 341 (Ohio 1956)).
33. Lunsford v. Sterilite of Ohio, L.L.C., 162 Ohio St. 3d 231, 243 (Ohio 2020) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Fowler V. Harper & Mary Coate McNeely, A Re-Examination of the Basis for
Liability for Emotional Distress, 1938 WIS. L. REV. 426, 451 (1938)).
34. Housh v. Peth, 165 Ohio St. 35 (Ohio 1956).
35. Sustin v. Fee, 69 Ohio St. 2d 143, 145 (Ohio 1982) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 652B (AM. L. INST. 1977)).
36. Housh, 165 Ohio St. at 35.
37. Id. at 44.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 41.
45. Id.
46. Id.
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shame or humiliation to a person of ordinary sensibilities.”47 Here, the
debt collector’s actions showed a systematic pattern of harassment that
breached the boundaries of what a reasonable person would find
acceptable. 48 Therefore, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that the debt
collector wrongfully intruded upon the woman’s right to privacy,
ultimately causing her mental suffering.49
The tort claim of intrusion upon seclusion focuses on the third element
of an invasion of privacy claim – “the wrongful intrusion into one’s
private activities in such manner as to outrage or cause mental suffering,
shame or humiliation to a person of ordinary sensibilities . . . .”50
Intrusion upon seclusion is premised on the “right to be left alone.”51 The
Restatement (Second) of Torts outlined the scope of liability for intrusion
upon seclusion: “One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise,
upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns,
is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the
intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.”52
The tort of intrusion upon seclusion is not limited to a physical invasion
of another. 53 The Restatement provides the example of Hamberger v.
Eastman in which a married couple brought suit against their landlord for
installing and concealing a recording device in their bedroom. 54 In
Hamberger, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire determined that the
landlord had intentionally invaded the couple’s right to privacy and was
subject to liability.55 The court noted that the determination for intrusion
is based on whether the action would be offensive to a reasonable
person.56
The Supreme Court of New Hampshire assessed that in this case, and
generally, the “limits [of decency] are exceeded where intimate details of
the life of one who has never manifested a desire to have publicity are
exposed to the public.”57 It was immaterial that the landlord’s recordings
were never publicly released.58 The mere act of intrusion and threat of

47. Id. at 35.
48. Id. at 41.
49. Id. at 35.
50. Id. at 35.
51. PETA v. Bobby Berosini, Ltd., 111 Nev. 615, 630 (Nev. 1995).
52. Sustin v. Fee, 69 Ohio St. 2d 143, 145 (Ohio 1982) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 652B (AM. L. INST. 1977)).
53. Hamberger v. Eastman, 106 N.H. 107, 111 (N.H. 1964).
54. Id. at 107.
55. Id. at 111.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 112.
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public release are enough to offend a reasonable person. 59 Therefore, the
Supreme Court of New Hampshire held that a person can be liable for an
intrusion upon seclusion without physically invading the private space of
another.60
The right to privacy is not absolute. In the employment law discipline,
consent is typically an absolute defense to an invasion of privacy claim. 61
The Restatement (Third) of the Law of Employment states: “One who
effectively consents to conduct of another intended to invade his interests
cannot recover in an action of tort for the conduct or for harm resulting
from it.”62 Therefore, if the person consented to the intrusion, the intruder
is not subject to liability even if the intrusion would be found highly
offensive to a reasonable person.
C. When Investigation Measures Go Beyond the Reasonable Scope:
Safford Unified School District No. 1 v. Redding
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that the school setting
requires a higher level of suspicion of wrongful activity before an invasive
search is justified.63 Generally, a law enforcement officer must determine
that there is a “fair probability” or “substantial chance” of discovering
evidence of criminal activity prior to conducting an evidentiary search. 64
In contrast, for school searches, the school administrator must determine
that there is a “moderate chance” of discovery.65 The Supreme Court
understood “moderate chance” to be a “lesser standard” than the “fair
probability” or “substantial chance” standards relating to discovering
criminal activity.66 A school search will be “permissible in its scope when
the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search
and not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and
the nature of the infraction.”67
In a permissible school search, the degree of intrusion must align with
a school administrator’s reasonable suspicion.68 In Safford Unified School
District No. 1 v. Redding, a thirteen-year-old girl was brought into the
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id.
Id.
Lunsford v. Sterilite of Ohio, LLC, 162 Ohio St. 3d 231, 240 (Ohio 2020).
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 7.06, cmt. h (AM. L. INST. 2015) (quoting
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892A(1) (AM. L. INST. 1979)).
63. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 370 (2009) (citing New Jersey v.
T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985)).
64. Id. at 371 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 244, n.13 (1983)).
65. Id. at 371.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 370 (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 (1985)).
68. Id. at 364.
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assistant principal’s office for suspicion of drug possession and
distribution.69 The assistant principal had received reports that the
thirteen-year-old student was distributing over-the-counter and
prescription anti-inflammatory drugs to other students.70 The student
denied the accusations and consented to a search of her person and
belongings.71 After the assistant principal was unable to find any evidence
within the student’s belongings, the assistant principal took the student to
the school nurse to conduct a search of her person.72 The school nurse
instructed the student to remove her jacket, t-shirt, pants, socks, and
shoes.73 Then, the student was ordered to pull her bra out to the side and
to pull on the elastic of her underpants, exposing her breasts and pelvic
area.74 No drugs were found after conducting the extensive search. 75 The
thirteen-year-old student, by and through her mother, sued the Safford
Unified School District and school employees, claiming the strip search
violated her Fourth Amendment rights.76
The Supreme Court found both the school nurse and assistant principal
had sufficient suspicion to justify searching the student’s belongings and
clothing.77 However, the school nurse did not have sufficient suspicion to
justify extending the search to the thirteen-year-old’s bra and
underwear. 78 First, the drugs were not a significant threat to the school
community.79 Second, there was no indication that the drugs would be in
the student’s bra or underwear. 80 Thus, the Court found that the invasive
search violated the student’s “reasonable societal expectations of personal
privacy.”81 The Supreme Court determined that the “meaning of such a
search, and the degradation its subject may reasonably feel, place a search
that intrusive in a category of its own demanding its own specific
suspicions.”82 While an intrusive evidence search may be justified in
certain circumstances, it must be reasonably related in scope to justify the
69. Id.
70. Id. at 368.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 369.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. The Fourth Amendment guarantees that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
77. Safford, U.S. 364 at 374.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 376.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 374.
82. Id. at 377.
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humiliation and indignity endured by the student.83 Therefore, the
Supreme Court held that the search of the student’s bra and underwear
went beyond the reasonable scope, was unreasonably intrusive, and
violated the Fourth Amendment.84
D. Drug Screening During Course of Employment
Employers have a general right to drug test employees as a condition
of their employment.85 Urine drug screens are the most common method
of drug analysis due to the ease of sampling.86 There are several urine
collection methods that ensure an unadulterated sample is captured for
testing. The collection precautions include the following: ensuring that
the collection area is secure, adding colored dye to toilet water, 87 turning
off running water during the collection process, asking employees to leave
jackets and other personal belongings outside the collection area,
checking the temperature of the urine specimens immediately after
voiding,88 or having a monitor accompany the employee into the restroom
while providing the employee a closed-door stall for privacy.89
The most invasive method of drug testing is direct observation. Direct
observation entails a third-party monitor observing the individual’s
genitals while he or she urinates into a collection cup. 90 The direct
observation method “represents a significant intrusion” into an
individual’s expectation of privacy.91 Society expects an individual’s
genitals to be kept private.92 Therefore, while direct observation is not a
prohibited drug testing method, it is likely a humiliating, degrading, and
intrusive experience for the individual.

83. Id. at 375.
84. Id. at 379.
85. State ex rel. Ohio AFL-CIO v. Ohio Bur. Workers' Comp., 97 Ohio St. 3d 504, (2002).
86. Karen E. Moeller et al., Urine Drug Screening: Practical Guide for Clinicians, 83 MAYO CLIN.
PROCS. 66, (2008).
87. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 661 (1989).
88. Bill Current, Thwarting Drug Test Cheaters, QUEST DIAGNOSTICS EMP. SOLS. BLOG (May 4,
2021) https://blog.employersolutions.com/thwarting-drug-test-cheaters.
89. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 658 (1995). The Supreme Court upheld the
school’s drug testing program for student athletes that maintained the student athletes’ personal
boundaries by having the monitor listen rather directly observe the collection process. Id.
90. Wilcher v. City of Wilmington, 139 F.3d 366, 375–76 (3d Cir. 1998).
91. Id. See also Lee v. Downs, 641 F.2d 1117, 1119 (4th Cir. 1981) (“Most people . . . have a
special sense of privacy in their genitals, and involuntary exposure of them in the presence of people of
the other sex may be especially demeaning and humiliating.”).
92. Skinner v. Ry. Lab. Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 617 (1989). See also Lovvorn v. City of
Chattanooga, 846 F.2d 1539, 1543 (6th Cir. 1988); Schaill by Kross v. Tippecanoe Cnty. Sch. Corp., 864
F.2d 1309, 1312 (7th Cir. 1988) (“There can be little doubt that a person engaging in the act of urination
possesses a reasonable expectation of privacy as to that act . . . .”).
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1. Drug Testing – Federally Regulated Professions
Federal regulations do provide some safeguards for the urine collection
process. Section II(D)(1)(i) discusses the federal regulations for drug
testing government employees, emphasizing the federal regulations’
prohibition of the direct observation method as standard practice. Further,
Section II(D)(1)(ii) focuses on the delicate balancing test between the
government’s public safety interests and the employee’s privacy interests
when conducting employment-related urine drug tests.
i. Federal Regulations
The federal government has promulgated regulations for employmentrelated drug testing. The Code of Federal Regulations (“C.F.R.”)
implemented drug testing collection procedures for safety-sensitive jobs
in the following industries: aviation, rail, motor carrier, mass
transportation, maritime, and nuclear power. 93 The detailed drug
collection procedures seek to ensure the integrity of the urine collections,
while also keeping the federally regulated employees’ privacy rights at
the forefront.
Federal regulations prohibit direct observation method as a standard
practice.94 Instead, the federal government adopts certain protocols to
safeguard the collection process, including, but not limited to: restricting
access to the designated restroom,95 removing outer clothing that could
conceal items that could be used to tamper with the specimen, 96 leaving
any personal belongings (e.g., a purse) outside the designated restroom, 97
tasking the monitor to astutely observe the employee for any conduct that
could indicate an intent to interfere with the testing process, 98 and
immediately checking the produced specimen’s temperature and color.99
These mandated procedures for safety-sensitive jobs are thorough, yet
maintain the employee’s dignity and privacy.
Because the direct observation method is an excessive intrusion of
privacy, federal regulations only allow direct observation when there is a

93. 49 C.F.R. pt. 40. See also 14 C.F.R. pt. 120 (implemented within the Federal Aviation
Administration); 49 C.F.R. § 219.701 (implemented within the Federal Railroad Administration); id. §
382.105 (implemented within the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration); id. § 655.51
(implemented within the Federal Transit Administration); id. § 199.5 (implemented within the Pipeline
and Hazardous Safety Administration); 46 C.F.R. § 16.113 (implemented within the U.S. Coast Guard).
94. 49 C.F.R. pt. 40.
95. Id. § 40.43(c)(1)–(2).
96. Id. § 40.61(f).
97. Id.
98. Id. § 40.63(e).
99. Id. § 40.65.
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reasonable suspicion as to the validity of the urinalysis.100 Pursuant to
federal regulations, the direct observation method may only be employed
under the following limited circumstances: lab results show the urine
sample was adulterated without an “adequate medical explanation,”101 the
urine sample is outside the allowable temperature range, 102 the monitor
observes conduct indicating an attempt to cheat, 103 an employee
previously failed a workplace drug or alcohol test,104 or the test is a
follow-up or return-to-duty for an employee who has been on alcohol or
substance abuse leave. 105 As demonstrated above, the federal government
acknowledges the efficacy of other non-invasive collection methods for
drug testing employees in safety-sensitive jobs, reserving the direct
observation method for exceptional circumstances.
ii. A Balancing Test
If the government can demonstrate the underlying public safety
interest, drug testing without “reasonable suspicion” does not violate an
employee’s right to privacy.106 In Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’
Association, the Federal Railway Association (“FRA”) enacted
regulations to mandate drug and alcohol tests for railroad employees. 107
The FRA regulations stemmed from railroad employees abusing drugs
and alcohol during the course and scope of their employment, posing a
significant threat to public safety.108 The FRA regulations prohibited
railroad employees from using or possessing drugs or alcohol during
employment.109 The regulations provided that railroad companies were
(1) required to bring all railroad employees to an independent testing
facility for blood and urine testing following major accidents, impact
accidents, or crew member fatalities and (2) permitted to mandate urine
and breath tests upon “reasonable suspicion” that the employee was under
the influence of drugs or alcohol.110 The Railway Labor Executives’
Association brought suit against the government, claiming the FRA
regulations violated the railroad employees’ privacy interests and Fourth

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id. § 40.67.
Id. § 40.67(a)(1)–(3).
Id. § 40.67(c)(3).
Id. § 40.67(c)(2).
10 C.F.R. § 26.69.
49 C.F.R. § 40.67(b)(5).
Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 634 (1989).
Id. at 603.
Id. at 606.
49 C.F.R. § 219.101(a)(1).
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 609–11.
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Amendment rights.111
The Supreme Court found that the government effectively
demonstrated that requiring a reasonable suspicion prior to subjecting the
railroad employee to drug testing would frustrate its efforts to improve
public safety.112 The Supreme Court acknowledged that individuals have
a reasonable expectation of privacy, and the FRA regulations intruded
upon this expectation.113 Yet, when the government has a legitimate
interest, the government’s intrusion on the individual’s expectation of
privacy is justified.114
While the majority determined the public safety interest trumped the
individual privacy interest, the Supreme Court devoted considerable time
to discussing the inherently private task of urination. 115 Pointing to the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit’s opinion in National Treasury
Employees Union v. Von Raab, the Supreme Court reiterated:
There are few activities in our society more personal or private than the
passing of urine. Most people describe it by euphemisms if they talk about
it at all. It is a function traditionally performed without public observation;
indeed, its performance in public is generally prohibited by law as well as
social custom.116

The Supreme Court determined that the FRA’s method of urinalysis
drug testing was not invasive.117 However, if the collection method
required visual or auditory monitoring of the employee during the
excretory function, the employee’s privacy interests should be
considered. 118 Because the drug testing maintained a minimal privacy
right to the railroad employees, the Supreme Court primarily focused on
the public need for guaranteed safe railway travel. 119 Therefore, the
Government’s public safety interest outweighed the railroad employees’
privacy concerns.120
Justice Marshall and Justice Brennan dissented, finding that the
majority placed too much emphasis on the government’s interests against
the railroad employees’ privacy interests, eroding Fourth Amendment
protection.121 The dissenters determined that employees do not shed their
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
1987)).
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id. at 612.
Id. at 621.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 617.
Id. (quoting National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170, 175 (5th Cir.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 604, 634.
Id.
Id. at 646 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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Fourth Amendment rights at the workplace door.122 Under the majority’s
decision, a railroad employee’s right to privacy would be substantially
invaded.123 While acknowledging the importance of the FRA’s efforts to
protect the public, Justices Marshall and Brennan concluded that the
majority too easily diminished the railroad employees’ right to personal
liberty.124
Specifically, the dissent addressed the issues surrounding urination
under the direct observation method.125 Society considers urination
among the most private, personal activities. Urination is prohibited in
public, avoided in conversation, and completed in spaces designed to
maintain personal privacy. 126 Collecting an employee’s urine sample by
direct observation is humiliating and intrusive.127 The dissent, quoting
law professor Charles Fried, asserted, “[I]n our culture the excretory
functions are shielded by more or less absolute privacy, so much so that
situations in which this privacy is violated are experienced as extremely
distressing, as detracting from one’s dignity and self esteem.”128 The
dissent found that the majority’s decision glossed over the profound
implications of urination under the direct observation method and failed
to properly weigh the railroad employees’ privacy rights.129 Therefore,
the dissent advocated for a fairer balancing approach between the
government’s interest in public safety and the railroad employees’ interest
in personal seclusion.130
Courts have continued to follow the balancing test applied in Skinner131
in which the government interests are weighed against the individual’s
right to privacy in cases between a public employer and its employee.132
In balancing the interests of the federally regulated employer and the
employee, courts have typically recognized that “the degree of intrusion
depends on the manner in which production of the urine sample is
monitored” rather than the urine sample production itself. 133

122. Id. at 648 (citing O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 716–18 (1987)).
123. Id. at 650, 655.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 645.
126. Id. at 645–46 (citing United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560 (1976)).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 646 (quoting Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 487 (1968)).
129. Id. at 647.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. See BNSF Ry. Co. v. U.S. Dep't Transp., 566 F.3d 200 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Wilcher v. City of
Wilmington, 139 F.3d 366 (3rd Cir. 1998); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
133. Acton, 515 U.S. at 658.

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2022

13

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 91, Iss. 1 [2022], Art. 5

2022]

PRIVACY PLEASE

191

2. Drug Testing – Private Employer
There is no such balancing test for the private sector. A private
employer may terminate an at-will employee for any reason so long as it
does not violate public policy.134 Further, employers have a general right
to drug test employees as a condition of their employment.135 For
example, in Baggs v. Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc.,136 the Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that a surprise mandatory drug
screening did not invade the at-will employees’ privacy rights, as the drug
screening was reasonably related to employment matters. 137
However, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit Court determined
that, in some circumstances, a private employer terminating an at-will
employee for refusing to consent to drug testing and to personal searches
might violate public policy on the basis of the common law tort claim for
invasion of privacy.138 In Borse v. Piece Goods Shop, Inc., the employer
implemented urinalysis drug screenings and personal property searches
pursuant to its drug and alcohol policy.139 The employer requested that its
employees sign a form consenting to the new drug and alcohol policy. 140
One employee who refused to sign the consent form was eventually
terminated.141 The employee sued her former employer,142 claiming her
termination violated public policy because the employer infringed upon
her right to privacy.143
The Third Circuit acknowledged that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
had not yet addressed the question of whether terminating an at-will
employee for refusing to submit to urinalysis drug testing and personal
property searches violates public policy.144 However, the Third Circuit
aimed to offer its best prediction and guidance in the event that the
question ever reached the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. 145 Like Ohio,
Pennsylvania has adopted a wrongful discharge cause of action for an atwill employee based on a public policy exception.146 Additionally,
Pennsylvania also recognizes a tortious action for intrusion upon

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Section II(A) infra.
Lunsford v. Sterilite of Ohio, L.L.C., 162 Ohio St. 3d 231, 238 (Ohio 2020).
Baggs v. Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc., 957 F.2d 268 (6th Cir. 1992).
Id. at 247.
Borse v. Piece Goods Shop, Inc., 963 F.2d 611 (3d Cir. 1992).
Id. at 611.
Id. at 613.
Id.
The case was brought in federal court due to diversity of citizenship.
Borse, 963 F.2d at 613.
Id. at 614.
Id.
Id. at 615. See Reuther v. Fowler & Williams, Inc., 386 A.2d 119 (1978).
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seclusion,147 which requires an intentional invasion of privacy that would
be “highly offensive to a reasonable person.”148
The Third Circuit envisioned at least two ways in which a private
employer’s urinalysis program could intrude upon an employee’s right to
seclusion.149 First, the “particular manner in which the program is
conducted” may constitute an intrusion upon seclusion. 150 The Third
Circuit reasoned that “[t]he process of collecting the urine sample to be
tested clearly implicates ‘expectations of privacy that society has long
recognized as reasonable.’”151 Further, there are many methods of
monitoring urine collection to ensure the employee does not cheat.152 The
Third Circuit concluded that “monitoring the collection of the urine
sample appears to fall within the definition of intrusion upon seclusion
because it involves the use of one’s senses to oversee the private activities
of another.”153 So, if the collection method fails to adequately consider
the employee’s privacy, it could constitute a “substantial and highly
offensive” intrusion upon seclusion.154 Second, urinalysis can divulge
private medical information about the employee.155
The Third Circuit further found that an employer’s unprompted search
of an employee’s personal property also constituted a tortious invasion of
privacy.156 The Third Circuit reasoned that there must be some limitations
and boundaries between a private employer and the at-will employee.157
The employer should not be able to justify any action as employmentrelated and to threaten termination if the employee fails to comply.158 The
Third Circuit effectively stated:
It may be granted that there are areas of an employee’s life in which his
employer has no legitimate interest. An intrusion into one of these areas by
virtue of the employer’s power of discharge might plausibly give rise to a
cause of action, particularly where some recognized facet of public policy
is threatened.159

Therefore, the Third Circuit predicted that if the Pennsylvania Supreme
147.
(1975).
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Borse, 963 F.2d at 620. See Marks v. Bell Telephone Co., 460 Pa. 73, 331 A.2d 424, 430
Borse, 963 F.2d at 620 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B).
Borse, 963 F.2d at 621.
Id.
Id. (quoting Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 617 (1989)).
Id. (citing National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 660 (1989)).
Id.
Id.
Id. (For example, urinalysis can reveal whether an employee is pregnant, diabetic, or epileptic.)
Id.
Id. at 622.
Id.
Id. (quoting Geary v. U.S. Steel Corp., 319 A.2d 174, 180 (1974)).
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Court determined that an employee’s termination was related to a
“substantial and highly offensive”160 invasion of the employee’s privacy,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would conclude that the termination
violated public policy.161 To determine whether the employer invaded the
employee’s right to privacy, the Third Circuit recommended the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court apply a fact-intensive balancing test,
weighing the employee’s privacy interests against the employer’s interest
in maintaining a drug-free workplace. 162 However, in the case at hand,
the Third Circuit found the employee’s allegations were vague and
insufficient to adequately apply the balancing test.163 The employee’s
case was ultimately remanded to the district court, granting the employee
leave to amend her complaint.164
Other jurisdictions have also evaluated a private employer’s mandated
urinalysis drug testing program. These jurisdictions, regardless of the
holding, all balance the employee’s privacy interest against the
employer’s business interests to determine whether the employee’s
discharge violated public policy.165
E. Lunsford v. Sterilite of Ohio, LLC
In December 2016, Adam Keim and Laura Williamson, former at-will
employees, and Donna Lunsford and Peter Griffiths, current at-will
employees, brought suit against their employer, Sterilite, and the thirdparty agent U.S. Healthworks Medical Group of Ohio, Inc. (“U.S.
Healthworks”), asserting invasion of privacy and wrongful discharge in
violation of public policy.166
Sterilite, a private company that manufactures plastic storage
containers, had a workplace substance abuse policy that applied to all
employees.167 Compliance with the substance abuse policy was a
condition of employment.168 The policy’s purpose was to “promote a
healthy, safe and productive workplace for all employees.” 169 Sterilite

160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 625.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 626.
165. See Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc., 768 P.2d 1123 (Alaska 1989); Twigg v. Hercules
Corp., 406 S.E.2d 52 (W. Va. 1990); Hennessey v. Coastal Eagle Point Oil Co., 589 A.2d 170 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1991).
166. Complaint at ¶¶1-40, Lunsford v. Sterilite of Ohio, LLC, No. 2016-CV-02774, 2016 WL
11499616 (filed Dec. 22, 2016).
167. STERILITE CORP., supra note 1.
168. Lunsford v. Sterilite of Ohio, L.L.C., 162 Ohio St. 3d 231, 232 (Ohio 2020).
169. Id.

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol91/iss1/5

16

Black: Privacy Please — Direct Observation Drug Testing & Invasion of Pr

194

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 91

preserved the right to change the policy at any time.170 The policy outlined
three circumstances in which Sterilite may exercise its discretion to
submit an employee to drug testing: (1) while investigating a workplace
incident; (2) when there is reasonable suspicion that an employee is under
the influence of drugs or alcohol; and (3) at random.171 The policy
established that urinalysis would be used to test for the presence of illegal
substances and/or the improper use of over-the-counter and prescription
drugs.172 However, the policy did not mention how the urine sample
would be collected.173 Under the policy, the employee must produce a
valid urine sample within two and a half hours.174 If the employee failed
to provide a urine sample within the allotted time, the employee would be
considered to have refused the test and subject to immediate
termination.175 If the employee’s sample tested positive for illegal drugs
or the improper use of prescription or over-the-counter drugs, the
employee would be subject to disciplinary action and, potentially,
termination.176 Sterilite reserved an office restroom to conduct the drug
testing.177 In October 2016, Sterilite hired U.S. Healthworks to administer
the workplace drug-testing program.178
Also in October 2016, U.S. Healthworks, at Sterilite’s direction, began
collecting urine samples by the direct observation method which requires
a same-sex monitor to accompany the employee into the restroom to
visually observe the employee produce a urine sample.179 Three of the
employees – Lunsford, Williamson, and Griffiths – were randomly
selected for drug testing on October 4, October 12, and November 8,
2016, respectively.180 On October 9, 2016, the fourth employee, Keim,
was asked to submit a urine sample due to a reasonable suspicion of
impairment.181 The employees were instructed to report to the designated
restroom to submit a urine sample.182 Prior to entering the restroom, a
U.S. Healthworks agent handed each employee a consent form.183 The
consent form provided:

170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 233.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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I hereby give my consent and authorize U.S. Healthworks staff and its
designated laboratory to perform any testing necessary to determine the
presence and/or level of drugs in my body on behalf of my * * * current
employer, whose name I entered above. I further give my consent for U.S.
Healthworks to release any and all results to the aforementioned employer.
I agree to hold harmless all U.S. Healthworks employees, physicians, and
agents involved in the performance of the testing, from any action that may
arise from the disclosure of such test results to the aforementioned
employer * * *184

The consent form did not specify how the urine sample was to be
collected.
Before October 2016, Sterilite’s collection methods did not include
direct observation.185 The employees, never having undergone direct
observation collection, signed the consent form. 186 The employees were
not informed of the direct observation method until after executing the
consent form.187 The employees were notified of the new collection
method when they reported to Sterilite’s designated restroom. 188 The
employees reluctantly proceeded with the drug test under direct
observation.189 Lunsford and Griffiths were able to produce a urine
sample; however, Williamson and Keim were unable to produce a urine
sample within the required two-and-a-half-hour window.190 Sterilite
subsequently fired Williamson and Keim pursuant to its substance abuse
policy.191
The employees then filed against Sterilite and U.S. Healthworks in the
Stark County Court of Common Pleas on December 22, 2016, claiming
that Sterilite and U.S. Healthworks invaded their privacy by requiring
them to produce urine samples under the direct observation method.192
Both Sterilite and U.S. Healthworks filed separate motions to dismiss.193
The trial court granted both motions to dismiss, concluding that Ohio
“does not recognize an invasion-of-privacy claim by an at-will employee
based solely on an employer’s use of the direct-observation method
during drug testing, particularly when the at-will employee agreed to be
tested as a condition of employment.”194 The employees appealed the

184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 234.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 234–35.
Id.
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decision and the Fifth District of the Court of Appeals of Ohio
unanimously reversed, holding that the employees had stated a valid claim
for invasion of privacy pursuant to the requirement of the Supreme Court
of Ohio in Housh v. Peth.195 The Fifth District found that employees have
“a reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to the exposure of their
genitals.”196 Sterilite and U.S. Healthworks then appealed the Fifth
District’s decision to the Supreme Court of Ohio.197
1. Employer’s Argument
Sterilite argued that, in Ohio, employees of a private employer do not
have a reasonable expectation of privacy when undergoing a drug test.198
Sterilite, an at-will employer, required compliance with the substance
abuse policy as a condition of employment.199 Sterilite reasoned the drug
testing was job-related, and therefore, within the acceptable bounds of atwill employment conditions.200
Sterilite further contended that the employees signed the consent form
and were notified that the drug test would be collected by direct
observation method prior to entering the restroom.201 The employees thus
waived their invasion of privacy claim by consenting to the drug test via
direct observation.202 Therefore, according to Sterilite, an at-will
employee does not have a cause of action against an employer for
invasion of privacy claim.203 U.S. Healthworks agreed with Sterilite’s
argument.204
2. Employees’ Argument
The employees conceded that they were at-will employees and that
Sterilite was justified in adopting its workplace substance abuse policy.205
The employees also took no issue regarding an employer’s general right
to drug test its employees.206 However, the employees claimed that they

195. Lunsford v. Sterilite of Ohio, LLC, 108 N.E.3d 1235, 1242 (Ohio Ct. App. 2018); see generally
Housh v. Peth, 165 Ohio St. 35 (Ohio 1956).
196. Lunsford, 108 N.E.3d at 1242.
197. Lunsford v. Sterilite of Ohio, L.L.C, 162 Ohio St. 3d 231, 250 (Ohio 2020).
198. Id. at 235.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 236.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 243.
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had a reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to the exposure of
their genitals.207 The highly intrusive direct observation method was
unwarranted, acting as a “wrongful intrusion into one’s private activities
in such a manner as to outrage or cause mental suffering, shame or
humiliation to a person of ordinary sensibilities.”208 Therefore, the direct
observation method was an invasion of that right to privacy. 209
The employees argued that at-will employers should not have
unrestricted discretion as to the method of drug testing. 210 In support of
the employees, the Ohio Employment Lawyers Association (the
“OELA”) submitted an amici curiae brief to the Supreme Court of
Ohio.211 The OELA wanted to highlight the importance of maintaining
the basic right to bodily privacy in Ohio workplaces. 212 The OELA
outlined how direct observation is not the sole method to ensure a urine
sample is safe from corruption.213 Because the employees did not perform
safety-sensitive tasks at Sterilite, they argued that Sterilite’s use of the
direct collection method was unnecessary and unreasonable. 214 Instead,
the employees contended, Sterilite should have been required to strike the
proper balance between its right to drug test and the privacy rights of its
employees.215
Finally, the employees stated that while they signed the consent form
for the drug test, the consent form failed to describe the collection
method.216 Further, the employees contended that they should not have
been forced to choose between displaying their genitalia for a random
drug test or being terminated.217 The employees felt pressured to continue
the drug test when being informed of the collection method as they
entered the designated restroom.218 The employees did not have proper
notice to make a fully considered decision as to whether to submit to drug
testing under the unduly intrusive direct observation method.219
Therefore, because no consent was given to the method of collection, the
employees contended that they were not barred from bringing their

207. Id. at 239.
208. Id. (quoting Housh v. Peth, 165 Ohio St. 35, 35 (Ohio 1956)).
209. Lunsford v. Sterilite of Ohio, LLC, 108 N.E.3d 1235, 1241 (Ohio Ct. App. 2018).
210. Id.
211. See generally Brief for Ohio Employment Lawyers Association, as Amici Curiae Supporting
Appellees, Lunsford v. Sterilite of Ohio, LLC, 108 N.E.3d 1235 (Ohio Ct. App. 2018) (No. 2018-1431).
212. Id. at 1.
213. Id. at 12.
214. Lunsford v. Sterilite of Ohio, L.L.C, 162 Ohio St. 3d 231, 239 (Ohio 2020).
215. Id.
216. Id. at 236.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 248.
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common law invasion of privacy claim.220
3. A Divided Court
In a (4-3) decision, the Ohio Supreme Court held that an at-will
employee who consents to submit a urine sample for a drug screening has
no cause of action for invasion of privacy.221
i. The Majority Opinion
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, 222 reversed the Fifth
District’s holding, concluding that at-will employees who consented to a
drug test by direct observation do not have an actionable invasion of
privacy claim. 223 The majority found for the employer because (1) the atwill employment relationship required compliance with Sterilite’s
workplace substance abuse policy;224 (2) no Fourth Amendment
protections or Ohio statutes or constitutional provisions attach due to
Sterilite’s status as a private company;225 and (3) the Employees willingly
consented to the direct observation method, waiving their right to
privacy.226
First, the majority situated an employee’s right to privacy within the
context of an at-will employment relationship.227 Sterilite was entitled to
condition employment on consenting to and successfully passing a drug
test by direct observation.228 If either party to the at-will employment
relationship is dissatisfied, the party may dissolve the relationship.229 The
majority acknowledged there are limitations to an at-will employment
relationship outlined in legislative statutes;230 however, the employees’
invasion of privacy claim fell outside the scope of these statutes.231
Second, the majority confined the employees’ invasion of privacy
claim to the common law right to privacy.232 Sterilite is a private

220. Id. at 236.
221. Id. at 232.
222. French, Fischer, and DeWine, JJ., joined in the opinion.
223. Lunsford, 162 Ohio St. 3d at 232.
224. Id. at 238.
225. Id. at 239.
226. Id. at 240.
227. Id. at 238.
228. Id. at 242.
229. Id. at 238 (citing Lake Land Emp. Group of Akron, LLC v. Columber, 101 Ohio St. 3d 242
(Ohio 2004)).
230. Mers v. Dispatch Printing Co., 19 Ohio St. 3d 100, 103 (Ohio 1985).
231. Lunsford, 162 Ohio St. 3d at 238.
232. Id. at 239.
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company, not a state actor, and thus not subject to a Fourth Amendment
claim.233 Further, the employees’ claims were not based on an Ohio
statute or constitutional provision.234 Therefore, Sterilite had no
obligation to consider its business interests against the employees’
privacy interests.235
Third, the majority determined that employees’ consent to the drug test
by direct observation invalidated their invasion of privacy claim because
consent acts as an absolute defense to such a claim.236 Sterilite’s
workplace substance abuse policy centered on the employee’s consent,
which the majority found to be essential to the right to privacy: “the
individual’s exclusive right to determine the occasion, extent, and
conditions under which [the individual] will disclose his [or her] private
affairs to others.”237 Further, an employee who agrees to a drug test
cannot later claim the testing procedure was highly offensive and
invasive.238 The majority acknowledged that the consent form did not
provide the drug collection method; however, the majority found this fact
immaterial to the outcome of its decision.239 The majority determined that
once the employees were made aware of the collection method, they were
given a second chance to either consent or refuse the drug test. 240 By
consenting the second time, the employees waived their right to
privacy.241 Therefore, the majority held the employees had no cause of
action for invasion of privacy against Sterilite and U.S. Healthworks.242
ii. The Dissenting Opinion
Justice Stewart, writing for the minority,243 concluded that the
employees’ complaint stated a valid claim for invasion of privacy
sufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss.244 The minority found for the
employees because: (1) Sterilite’s invasive drug testing procedure
violated the employees’ right to privacy;245 (2) the at-will employment

233.
234.
235.
236.
2015)).
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 241 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 7.06, cmt. h (AM. L. INST.
Id. (quoting Jennings v. Minco Tech. Labs, Inc., 765 S.W.2d 497, 500 (Tex. App. 1989)).
Id. (citing Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc., 768 P.2d 1123, 1137-1138 (Alaska 1989)).
Lunsford, 162 Ohio St. 3d at 241.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 242.
O’Connor, C.J., and Donnelly, J., joined.
Lunsford v. Sterilite of Ohio, L.L.C., 162 Ohio St. 3d 231, 243 (Ohio 2020).
Id. at 244.
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doctrine does not supplant an employee’s right to bring a claim against
the employer for invasion of privacy;246 and (3) the employees did not
consent, directly or implicitly, as to the method of the drug test.247
First, the minority concluded that Sterilite’s drug test collection method
was highly invasive, violating the employees’ right to privacy. 248 The
minority stated that the direct observation method is contrary to societal
norms.249 Society dictates that urination be kept private.250 The minority
acknowledged that there are some circumstances in which direct
observation is necessary, for example, if there is some reason to suspect
the employee will tamper with the urine sample.251 However, because of
the invasion of privacy concerns, the use of direct observation method
should be limited.252 Therefore, the minority concluded that Sterilite
could have used less intrusive means to achieve the same drug test results
while preserving the employees’ right to privacy.253
Second, the minority determined that the at-will employment doctrine
had no relationship to the employees’ claim, nor did it lessen an
employee’s expectation of privacy.254 Further, upon agreeing to be at-will
employees, the employees likely did not anticipate the employment
relationship to include the requirement to put their genitalia on display. 255
Therefore, the minority concluded that the at-will employment doctrine
“does not supersede an employee’s right to obtain redress for the violation
of his or her privacy rights.”256
Third, the minority found the employees neither directly nor implicitly
consented to the direct observation method.257 The employees did not
explicitly consent because the form failed to include the new collection
method.258 The employees did not implicitly consent, despite proceeding
with the drug test even after receiving notice that direct observation
method would be used, because of the at-will employment power
dynamics in play.259 The employees were faced with a difficult decision:

246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.

Id. at 247.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 245.
Id. at 246.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 247 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 248.
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either provide a urine sample under direct observation or be dismissed.260
The minority determined that the employees were left with no appropriate
choice, underscoring the principle, “consent [is] not valid if given under
compulsion.”261 Therefore, because no consent was given, the employees
should not be barred from bringing their invasion of privacy claim.262
The minority concluded its dissent with the following warning:
What indignities must an at-will employee suffer to avoid losing his or her
income and benefits before the employee has a cause of action for invasion
of privacy? Make no mistake, the majority’s decision today will
disproportionately affect workers who have no meaningful choice and no
recourse for their employers’ intentional torts.263

III. DISCUSSION
The Supreme Court of Ohio’s decision in Lunsford embraced a private
employer’s unbridled discretion in unwarranted, intrusive drug testing
methods.264 The Lunsford decision leaves an at-will employee with no
expectation of privacy in the workplace and no legal recourse for their
employers’ intentional torts.265 As Justice Stewart’s dissent underscored,
the majority’s decision permits a private employer to subject an at-will
employee to unrestricted humiliation, citing the at-will employment
doctrine as justification.266 This result demands that the employee submit
or be terminated.
Consequently, Section III(A) discusses why the Supreme Court of
Ohio, in an effort to distinguish between a public and private employer,
inadvertently subsumes the private employee’s right to privacy. Next,
Section III(B) recommends that Ohio adopt the balancing test
recommended by the Third Circuit in Borse v. Piece Goods Shop, Inc.267
This balancing test would respect both the private employer’s business
interests for a drug-free workplace and the employee’s reasonable
expectation of privacy. Finally, Section III(C), acknowledging the
Lunsford decision as binding precedent, discusses how an Ohio private
employer that chooses to adopt a direct observation drug testing policy
similar to Sterilite should employ an explicit consent form to protect itself
260. Id.
261. Id. (citing Leibowitz v. H.A. Winston Co., 492 A.2d 111, 114-116 (Pa. Super. 1985)). See also
Doyon v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 850 F. Supp. 125, 130 (D. Conn. 1994); Polsky v. Radio Shack, 666
F.2d 824, 825–27 (3d Cir. 1981).
262. Lunsford, 162 Ohio St. 3d at 249.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 231.
265. Id. at 249.
266. Id.
267. 963 F.2d 611 (3d Cir. 1992).
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against similar employee claims.
A. A False Distinction
In an effort to distinguish between a public and private employer, the
Supreme Court of Ohio inadvertently subsumes the private employee’s
right to privacy. The court errs in assuming that, without the Fourth
Amendment protections afforded to employees of public employers,
employees of private employers are left without any right to privacy. The
Supreme Court of Ohio found that, unlike an individual working for a
public employer who has Fourth Amendment protections, an employee
working for a private employer should have a reduced expectation of
privacy.268 However, an individual should not be subjected to this highly
intrusive and offensive invasion of privacy simply because they work for
a private employer. Employees who work for a private employer should
not be forced to display their genitals to a stranger while urinating as a
baseline condition of employment. Further, an employer should not be
permitted to intrude upon an employee’s right to privacy absent a showing
of reasonable suspicion or a workplace safety concern. This level of
unwarranted intrusion is a well-established violation of public policy,269
falling into the public policy exception to the employment-at-will
doctrine.
Looking beyond the public vs. private employer distinction, the direct
observation method is unduly invasive. The Supreme Court of Ohio, in
its majority decision, even acknowledged that an employee’s privacy
rights are implicated when direct observation is used.270 It is unclear why
the Supreme Court of Ohio did not give more weight to Housh v. Peth.271
In Housh, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that a person who intentionally
intrudes upon the privacy of another in such a manner that would be
“highly offensive to a reasonable person” is subject to liability under a
tortious invasion of privacy claim.272 The Supreme Court of Ohio in
Housh determined that the debt collector had a right to take reasonable
action to recover the outstanding debt.273 However, the debt collector
went too far and used unreasonable tactics in his efforts to satisfy the
debt.274 Analogous to Housh, Sterilite had a right to drug test its

268. Lunsford, 162 Ohio St. 3d at 242.
269. See generally Housh v. Peth, 165 Ohio St. 35 (Ohio 1956); Hamberger v. Eastman, 106 N.H.
107, 111 (N.H. 1964); Sustin v. Fee, 69 Ohio St. 2d 143, 145 (Ohio 1982).
270. Lunsford, 162 Ohio St. 3d at 240.
271. 165 Ohio St. 35 (Ohio 1956).
272. Lunsford, 162 Ohio St. 3d at 240.
273. Housh, 165 Ohio St. at 41.
274. Id.
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employees to ensure a safe work environment. However, Sterilite
overstepped by using an excessively invasive urine collection method.
Therefore, the Supreme Court of Ohio should have set aside the
employment-at-will doctrine and focused solely on the invasion of
privacy claim. The public vs. private distinction should not matter in
regard to an individual’s right to privacy.
B. Adopting a Balanced Approach
The Ohio judiciary should adopt the balancing test recommended by
the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Borse v. Piece
Goods Shop, Inc.275 As outlined in Section II(D)(2),276 to determine
whether the employer invaded the employee’s right to privacy, the Third
Circuit recommended the Pennsylvania Supreme Court apply a factintensive balancing test, weighing the employee’s privacy interests
against the employer’s interest in maintaining a drug-free workplace. 277
If the collection method fails to adequately consider the employee’s
privacy, it could constitute a “substantial and highly invasive” intrusion
upon seclusion.278
Considering an employee’s privacy interests will not sacrifice the
integrity of the drug test. Direct observation is not necessary to ensure the
veracity of the employee’s drug test results.279 The multi-step urine
collection methods outlined in the Code of Federal Regulations are
designed to maintain the specimen’s integrity, while still preserving the
government employee’s right to privacy.280 To that end, the federal
regulations prohibit direct observation as a standard collection practice.281
If these two competing interests can be adequately balanced for safetysensitive and government professions (e.g., commercial airline pilots,
nuclear power plant workers, the U.S. Coast Guard, etc.), then surely the
competing interests between Sterilite, a private employer that
manufactures plastic containers, and its employees can also be satisfied
by applying this balancing test.

275. 963 F.2d 611 (3d Cir. 1992).
276. Section II(D)(2), infra.
277. Id. at 625.
278. Id. at 611.
279. Section II(D)(1)(ii), infra.
280. Procedures for Transportation Workplace Drug and Alcohol Testing Programs, 49 C.F.R. §
40. See also 14 C.F.R. § 120 (Federal Aviation Administration)l 49 C.F.R. § 219.701 (Federal Railroad
Administration); id. § 382.105 (Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration); id. § 655.51 (Federal
Transit Administration); id. § 199.5 (Pipeline and Hazardous Safety Administration); 46 C.F.R. § 16.113
(U.S. Coast Guard).
281. Section II(D)(1)(i), infra.
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C. The Importance of Fully Informed Consent
The Supreme Court of Ohio wrongly found that the employees
consented to the direct observation method. This conclusion barred the
employees from their invasion of privacy claim, as consent is typically an
absolute defense. 282 Therefore, if the person consented to the intrusion,
the intruder is not subject to liability even if the intrusion would be highly
offensive to a reasonable person.283 Yet, as discussed by the minority
Lunsford opinion, the employees neither directly nor implicitly consented
to the direct observation method.284 The provided consent form failed to
identify the new collection method.285 Further, the employees were not
informed of the new collection method until they entered the designated
restroom.286 The employees’ consent was compelled by the threat of
termination and thus, did not truly have a consequence-free choice when
deciding to succumb to Sterilite’s invasive direct observation method. As
addressed by the Third Circuit in Borse v. Piece Goods Shop, Inc, an
employer should not be able to justify any action as employment-related
and to threaten termination if the employee fails to comply.287 The Third
Circuit underscored:
It may be granted that there are areas of an employee’s life in which his
employer has no legitimate interest. An intrusion into one of these areas by
virtue of the employer’s power to discharge might plausibly give rise to a
cause of action, particularly where some recognized facet of public policy
is threatened.288

Now that Lunsford is binding precedent, if an Ohio private employer
seeks to use the direct observation method, it is advisable to draft a
substance abuse policy and/or consent form that explicitly identifies the
collection method. This action will provide a private employer with a
clear defense against a similar employee invasion of privacy claim and
allow the employee additional time to decide whether to consent. By
allowing additional time to consent, an Ohio private employer can avoid
arguing whether consent was unwillingly given under duress. Further,
Sterilite also created conflicting precedent regarding invasion of privacy
claims, which will lead to confusion in the lower courts.

282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.

Lunsford v. Sterilite of Ohio, L.L.C., 162 Ohio St. 3d 231, 240 (Ohio 2020).
Id.
Id. at 247-249.
Id.
Id.
Borse v. Piece Goods Shop, Inc., 963 F.2d at 622.
Id. (quoting Geary v. U.S. Steel Corp., 319 A.2d 174, 180 (3d Cir. 1974)).
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IV. CONCLUSION
Ultimately, the Supreme Court of Ohio should have found for the
employees in Lunsford v. Sterilite of Ohio, LLC, by holding that, in some
instances, an at-will employee has a cause of action for invasion of
privacy if they are compelled to consent to urinalysis via direct
observation. Further, the court should have found that the employees
stated a valid claim for invasion of privacy pursuant to the requirements
outlined in its decision in Housh v. Peth. The direct observation method
is highly intrusive, offending a person of ordinary sensibilities and a
private employer should not have unbridled discretion to subject at-will
employees to such indignity and humiliation. Employees, when choosing
to work for a private employer, should be able to maintain the basic right
to bodily privacy. An employee’s right to bodily privacy can be respected
and an employer’s business interests can be concurrently satisfied while
using other less intrusive drug testing procedures.
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